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Abstract
This paper raises some specific issues concerning the choice of exchange rate regime in
transition countries during the run-up to EU/EMU membership. It argues that there is no
“one-size-fits-all” exchange rate regime that accession countries should uniformly adopt. It
also argues that the Maastricht criterion on inflation is inconsistent with the catching-up
process because of the Balassa-Samuelson effect and that this inconsistency will encourage
a “weighing-in” syndrome: like the boxer who refrains from eating for hours prior to the
weigh-in only to consume a big meal once the weigh-in is over, the candidate country will
maintain very tight monetary policy and resort to all sorts of techniques (freezing of
administered prices, lowering of consumption taxes, etc.) to squeeze down inflation prior
to accession only to shift back gears after it has joined the EMU. Indeed, the convergence
of short-term interest rates to EMU levels that will come with accession will automatically
mean a loosening of monetary policy after the country has become a member of the
monetary union. That loosening will be reinforced if the country had previously allowed its
exchange rate to appreciate against the euro. The result of this stop-go cycle is that the
efficiency of economic management will suffer. It would be better to recognize the
principle of the Balassa-Samuelson effect explicitly in the Maastricht criteria by giving more
room for maneuver than the one provided by the present rule. The paper makes
suggestions on how the Maastricht criterion on inflation could be adjusted and discusses
their merits. It concludes that a reasonable compromise would be to define the permissible
inflation deviation in reference to the average inflation rate of the euro zone, not the three
EU members with the lowest inflation rate.
* Advisor to the President of the National Bank of Hungary. An earlier version of this paper was
presented at the conference organized by the International Triffin Foundation on “The Fragility of
the International Financial System”, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium, September 14-15, 2000. I would
like to thank Zsolt Darvas, Daniel Gros, Eduard Hochreiter, András Simon and János Vincze for
their useful comments without implicating them. The views expressed in the paper are strictly
personal and in no way commit the National Bank of Hungary.1
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I. Introduction
With the creation of EMU, a new chapter has been opened in the debate about the issue of
exchange rate regime choice.  At stake is the selection of an exchange rate regime that will
best serve the interests of the accession countries from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)
as they prepare to join the EU and to meet the Maastricht criteria which will allow them to
enter later the EMU. There is little doubt that from an economic standpoint, the CEEs,
small economies as they are, have a strong interest in joining the euro zone once they have
liberalized the trade and capital flows and have become a member of the EU. Entry into
the euro zone will mean lower risk premium and interest rates, as well as lower transaction
costs (to mention just the most obvious economic advantages), along with a say in shaping
the ECB’s monetary policy, the independence from which becomes more imaginary than
real once a small country has de facto integrated into the economy of the euro zone. The
question is whether there is an ideal exchange rate regime for transition countries during
the run-up to EMU which can ensure stability, maintain competitiveness, promote
structural reforms and also help to meet the Maastricht criterion on inflation.
The purpose of this paper is not to discuss the many aspects of the issue of exchange rate
regime choice, a topic which is examined and debated in a vast body of literature. Rather, it
would like to raise, particularly in the light of the current high degree of globalization of
financial flows, some specific issues facing the accession countries which are closest to
EU/EMU membership. In this context, the paper raises the issue of the adequacy of the
Maastricht criterion on inflation and makes some suggestions for adjusting that criterion.
The accession countries maintain a wide diversity of exchange rate regimes: practically all
varieties can be found from currency board arrangements (e.g., Estonia) to floating regimes
(e.g., the Czech Republic and Poland since April)
1. Hungary’s system is somewhere
between these two ends: a preannounced crawling peg with a relatively narrow band of ±
2.25 percent. A common goal of these countries is to move toward meeting the Maastricht
criteria while completing the transition, but there seems to be no direct link between the
exchange rate regime in place and the progress achieved in meeting that goal. For instance,
close to EU inflation level has been achieved in Estonia with a currency board and in the
Czech Republic with a floating regime; and approximately the same path of disinflation has
been secured in Poland with a wide band crawling peg and in Hungary with a narrow band
crawling peg (Chart 1). This is testimony to the fact that other policies matter more than
the exchange rate regime. Yet there is an issue of exchange regime choice because the
ultimate goal is to fix the currencies to the euro and that process should be as orderly and
efficient as possible.
                                                
1 Until April 2000, Poland had a preannounced crawling peg with a band which had been
progressively widened to ± 15 percent.GYÖRGY SZAPÁRY
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II. Characteristics of CEEs from the point of view of exchange rate regime
            choice
The acceding transition countries share a number of characteristics which have a bearing
on exchange rate policy. First, their wages and non-tradable prices are lower than those of
the EU countries. Since they have a lower level of technical development and productivity,
they are expected to grow faster than the EU as real convergence proceeds. This means
that their wages and non-tradable prices will grow faster in accordance with the Balassa-
Samuelson (BS) effect. The BS effect arises from the fact that the growth of productivity
differs among sectors while wages tend to be less differentiated. Typically, productivity
growth is faster in the traded goods sector than in the non-traded goods sector, such as
services. To the extent that the faster productivity growth in the traded goods sector
pushes up the wages in all sectors, the relative prices of the non-traded goods to those of
the traded goods will rise. Since the growth of productivity is, by definition, faster in a
catching-up economy than in a more mature economy, the BS effect implies that, ceteris
paribus, the CPI of the former will rise faster than that of the latter, as the levels of
productivity, wages, and non-traded goods prices converge between the two economies.
Hence, the real exchange rates of the accession countries, as measured by the CPI, will
appreciate during the catching-up process. However, this process will necessarily take many
years and the real appreciation has to be broadly in line with the underlying BS effect if the
country is to avoid loss of competitiveness and serious balance of payments problems.
The inflation differentials observed within the EMU and the approaching enlargement of
the EU have focused interest on the BS effect. ECB (1999) notes that there is clear
evidence that the BS effect has been at work within the euro area, though it does not
provide precise estimates. IMF (2000) reports calculations estimating the BS effect in the
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Chart 1: Inflation in Transition Countries, January 1990 - September 2000
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range of 1.5 and 2 percent per year for certain individual member countries of the EU.
Pelkmans-Gros-Nunez Ferrer (2000) make precise estimates for the candidate countries
and find that the BS effect could be around 3.5-4 percent for these countries. Simon and
Kovács (1998 and 2000) estimate the BS effect for Hungary at 1.9 percent per year during
the period 1991-98. For Slovenia, IMF (2000) reports an estimate of 2.5 percent per
annum. While these estimates for the candidate countries vary reflecting the different
methodologies of calculations, they all show that the BS effect for these countries exceeds
the 1.5 percent permissible inflation deviation under the Maastricht criterion.
Second, as a result of the liberalization of trade and payments, the economies of the
accession countries are highly open and integrated into a global financial system in which
the flow of capital is much less restricted than it was when, for instance, Spain, Portugal,
and Greece joined the EU. At the same time, because of their status as emerging markets,
the accession countries remain exposed to volatile capital flows, as witnessed during the
Russian financial crisis of 1998 when capital fled these countries, irrespective of the state of
their fundamentals or exchange rate regimes.
Third, the candidate countries still face relative price adjustments beyond the BS effect, due
to the continuous structural reforms and liberalization in such areas as telecommunication,
energy, transportation and healthcare. The inflationary impact of these changes is less
stable and progressive than that of the BS effect because it is linked to the timing of
reforms which, in turn, is often linked to the privatization of those activities.
Fourth, these countries have small domestic markets and rely heavily on exports and
imports for investment and growth. A loss of competitiveness translates fairly rapidly into a
deterioration of the balance of payments.
When considering the choice of an appropriate exchange rate regime, the authorities of the
accession countries are therefore confronted with three conflicting objectives: (i) to ensure
reasonable exchange rate stability in the face of capital volatility; (ii) to secure an orderly
real exchange rate appreciation more or less along the path dictated by the BS effect; and
(iii) to move toward meeting the Maastricht criterion on inflation.
The stability objective would be best served by a fixed rate regime. However, because of
the faster inflation inherent in the catching-up process and the risk that the required wage
flexibility and strong supportive policies to sustain a fixed rate can not be implemented, a
rigidly fixed rate carries the danger of leading to a rapid appreciation of the real exchange
rate which could prove intolerable for most countries. In Estonia, for example, where a
currency board arrangement is in effect, the real exchange rate appreciated by more than
100 percent between 1993 and 1999 (Chart 2). Estonia has been able to cope with this
appreciation because its wages are very low (relative to the skill of the labor force) and
because the small size of the country means that foreign direct investment (FDI) was able
to cover a large part of its sizable current account deficit, which averaged about 10 percent
of GDP in 1996-98. The other countries would not be able to tolerate such rapid
appreciation and such high current account deficit. The real appreciation in Estonia is
perhaps an extreme case and there are examples of fixed rate regimes where the real
appreciation was more modest and gradual. The point is that a fixed rate needs the backing
of strong monetary and fiscal policies and flexible wages which may not exist in all cases.GYÖRGY SZAPÁRY
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Furthermore, a fixed rate would deprive the country of one of its instruments, the nominal
appreciation of the currency, that could help the country to bring inflation down to the
Maastricht level without resorting to excessively tight monetary and fiscal policy.
A flexible exchange rate arrangement, in the form of a wide band or free floating regime
could, in principle, provide the possibility for a gradual appreciation of the real exchange
rate in conformity with the BS effect and could also help the country to meet the inflation
target without relying on unduly restrictive monetary and fiscal policy. However, because
transition countries are particularly exposed to the volatility of speculative capital flows,
such regimes may lead, as seen during 1997-98, to large real exchange rate variability.
Although opinions differ on how bad real exchange rate variability actually is, there are
convincing empirical studies in the literature which demonstrate their negative economic
effects
2. While the multinational firms operating in these countries might more easily cope
with real exchange rate fluctuations, the smaller domestically owned firms, whose
development is essential for broad-based economic prosperity, are much more sensitive to
changes in competitiveness. A wide band or free floating regime also carries the danger that
if the country’s fundamentals are seen by the markets as appropriate, the inflow of capital
will lead to an excessive appreciation of the currency. Good fundamentals are not a
precondition though, as evidenced by the large inflows into Russia prior to the summer of
1998.
One argument often made in favor of floating or wide bands is that it provides better
protection against speculative attacks. However, the experience during the Russian crisis of
Poland and Israel, two countries considered as emerging markets, showed that when there
is a sudden shift in market sentiment, wide bands do not shield against speculative attacks
3.
                                                
2 See for example Baldwin and Krugman (1989), Campa (1993) and Gourinchas (1999).
3 See Darvas and Szapáry (2000).
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Another argument is that because of the greater potential risk of depreciation, wide bands
discourage speculative capital inflows. The experience of the above two countries prior to
the Russian crisis does not support that argument, as both countries witnessed large capital
inflows.
Narrower bands reduce exchange rate variability and can also prevent an excessive
appreciation/depreciation at times of capital inflows/outflows. Whether this is a sensible
policy depends on the magnitude of the capital flows. Hungary has so far managed to
prevent an undue appreciation of its currency without excessive sterilization costs
4 and
successfully defended the forint without excessive loss of reserves in the wake of the
Russian crisis. This experience, and that of Greece when the authorities defended the
drachma during the Asian crisis, turned out to be beneficial, since output growth
strengthened and inflation continued to decline in both countries after the defense of their
currencies. The point to make here is that there are circumstances, i.e. when the
fundamentals are right, under which it makes sense to defend the currency in order to
maintain stability. A narrow band, if it is supported by credible policies, may also lead to
lower premium on domestic interest rates, since the risk of depreciation and exchange rate
variability are lower
5. That said, a narrow band is not necessarily the right regime for all
cases; the break-up of ERM1 illustrates that point. A narrow band, just as a fixed rate,
needs to be backed by adequate supportive policies.
III. The convergence play
The developments of the recent past place the issue of exchange regime choice in a
somewhat new light in the case of the accession countries. The most important event is the
creation of the EMU and the reasonable expectation that the applicant countries will follow
policies that will allow them to become a member of EMU in the not too distant future.
This seems to have provided enough of certainty for the markets to engage in speculation
for a convergence of interest rates and an appreciation of the exchange rates, if the
fundamentals of the country are judged to be broadly appropriate. Another important
development is the liberalization of markets. Capital has never been as free as it is now to
move across borders and the progress in technology has made the flow of capital much
easier and faster. There is a vast amount of potentially fickle capital ready to take a higher
risk in emerging markets in order to take advantage of higher expected returns. Fund
managers throughout the world invest only a small portion of their portfolio in emerging
markets to maximize returns. Investment banks offer dedicated emerging market funds to
investors, while advising them to invest only a small portion of their total portfolio into
such funds. While all this sounds very conservative from the point of view of the investor,
it adds up to billions of volatile dollars available to move around among emerging markets.
Capital flows that are insignificant for markets of the size of the United States or the euro
                                                
4 See Szapáry and Jakab (1998).
5 Until the Russian crisis, the interest rate premium was lower in Hungary which maintains a
narrow band preannounced crawling peg regime than in the Czech Republic with a free floating
regime and in Poland with a wide band regime. The Russian crisis triggered a change in market
sentiment and the interest rate premium in Hungary increased to the level of that prevailing in
the Czech Republic and Poland (see Darvas and Szapáry, op. cit.).GYÖRGY SZAPÁRY
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zone can be very disruptive for the exchange markets of small countries like the Czech
Republic, Hungary or even Poland.
Accession countries have some characteristics that promise good returns with less risks for
speculative capital. In order to meet the inflation criterion for joining the EMU, the
monetary authorities are likely to maintain a nominal interest rate level that is higher than
the uncovered interest rate parity, encouraging investment in fixed income investments,
such as government securities. The favorable growth prospects attract investment into the
stock markets of these countries by investors both with a short run and a medium to long
run perspective. The experience of Greece, Portugal and Spain, where stock markets
outperformed the other European markets in the years following their entry into the EU,
serves as a good example. The expected return on both of these types of portfolio
investments is enhanced by the anticipated appreciation of the exchange rate.
IV. No “one-size-fits-all” exchange rate regime
This situation creates specific problems for the accession countries. First, it is too early for
them to be caught up in the convergence play. The date of EMU membership is still
uncertain and an undue appreciation of their currencies or a too rapid fall in domestic
interest rates will not be consistent with their stabilization goals. Second, these countries
remain vulnerable to shifts in market sentiment triggered by financial crises elsewhere.  The
more speculative capital enters the country, the more capital will be able to leave it when
market perceptions change, undermining stability. In such circumstances, controls on
short-term capital flows might be of some help. Although such controls can be
circumvented once trade and long-term capital movements have been liberalized, they can
mute the magnitude of short-term capital movements by throwing sand into the wheels.
Nevertheless, since the ultimate goal is full liberalization, short-term capital controls can
only provide a temporary relief. At best one can argue in favor of not making a full
liberalization of short-term capital flows a precondition for EU accession, only a
precondition for joining ERM2.
The experiences with different exchange rate regimes in the transition countries and
elsewhere convincingly  show that there is no “one-size-fits-all” exchange rate regime that
accession countries should uniformly adopt in the run-up to EU/EMU membership. There
are many factors that need to be taken into account when selecting an exchange rate
regime. The most obvious is the strength of the political commitment to pursue
macroeconomic policies – in particular, fiscal, monetary and incomes policies – which will
ensure internal and external stability. The looser that commitment is, the less likely it is that
a rigidly fixed system can survive the pressures of the market. The progress with structural
reforms, such as privatization, the lifting of price controls, healthcare reforms, etc., also
need to be taken into consideration, since they influence the future path of inflation.
Slower progress in these areas would argue in favor of adopting a more flexible exchange
rate regime to accommodate the potential inflationary shocks.
Prior to EU membership, candidate countries are free to adopt the exchange rate regime of
their choice and they can enter the EU with their prevailing exchange rate regime. At some
point after their accession to the EU, they are expected to enter ERM2. The logic of ERM2
excludes the adoption of crawling pegs, free floating without a central rate, and pegs against
a currency other than the euro. It seems that the EU and the ECB will accept euro-basedMAASTRICHT & THE CHOICE OF EXCHANGE RATE REGIME IN TRANSITION COUNTRIES
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currency board arrangements (CBA) if they are deemed sustainable, although the question
of the exchange rate being a “matter of common interest” is raised if it turns out that the
exchange rate under the CBA is not sustainable. The EU is likely to turn around this
problem by declaring that CBA may be compatible with ERM2 as a “unilateral
commitment”, meaning that the Eurosystem is not committed to take part in any possible
defense of the peg. Since a rigidly fixed rate in the form of a CBA, or in any another form
for that matter (e.g. the hard currency policy of Austria)
6, can be a powerful catalyst for the
adoption of the right policies, the acceptance of the CBA as a form of participation in
ERM2 is appropriate. The EU is likely to take the view that euroization is not compatible
with ERM2 on the grounds that it should be the final act of the convergence process and
that the new members should receive treatment equal to that of the initial members with
respect to the fulfillment of the convergence criteria. In my view, the most serious problem
with euro-ization or a CBA is that it takes away the possibility of an appreciation of the
nominal exchange rate as an instrument of disinflation, placing all the burden of meeting
the Maastricht criterion on inflation on monetary and fiscal policy. This brings me to point
out an inconsistency built into the Maastrich criteria.
V. Encourage “weighing-in” syndrome or change the Maastricht criterion on
            inflation?
One of the Maastricht criteria is that one year prior to joining the EMU, the accession
country’s rate of inflation should not exceed by more than 1.5 percentage point the average
rate of inflation in those three EU countries where inflation is the lowest. Since, as pointed
out earlier, the catching-up process implies a higher rate of inflation, it is not logical to
demand the same level of inflation from countries at very different stages of development.
The same level of inflation can only be achieved either by a very restrictive monetary and
fiscal policy which may result in an excessive sacrifice to growth and employment or by an
appreciation of the nominal exchange rate. The appreciation of the nominal exchange rate
is likely to be resisted because of a fear of loss of competitiveness as capital inflows
intensify with the approach of EMU membership. Since there is a lag between an
appreciation of the nominal exchange rate and the concomitant slowing down of CPI, the
combination of higher inflation and a nominal appreciation may lead to excessive loss of
competitiveness. This will encourage the candidate countries to adopt an attitude which
one might call the “weighing-in” syndrome: like the boxer who refrains from eating for
hours prior to the weigh-in only to consume a big meal once the weigh-in is over, the
candidate country will maintain very tight monetary policy and resort to all sorts of
techniques (freezing of administered prices, lowering of consumption taxes, etc.) to
squeeze down inflation prior to accession only to shift back gears after it has joined the
EMU. The convergence of short-term interest rates to EMU levels that will come with
accession will automatically mean a loosening of monetary policy after the country has
become a member of the monetary union. That loosening will be reinforced if the country
had previously allowed its exchange rate to appreciate against the euro. The result of this
stop-go cycle is that the efficiency of economic management will suffer.
It would be better to recognize the principle of the BS effect explicitly in the Maastricht
criteria by giving more room for maneuver than the one provided by the present rule which
                                                
6 See Hochreiter and Winckler (1995).GYÖRGY SZAPÁRY
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falls short of most estimates of the BS effect. From a strictly economic point of view, the
logical solution would be to link the permissible inflation deviation to the size of the
productivity growth differential, since it is that differential which determines the BS effect.
However, because the growth of productivity is subject to cyclical factors which can differ
from one country to the other, it would be difficult to find a standard measurement of the
BS effect which can be uniformly applied for defining the permissible inflation deviation. A
better solution would be to group both the member countries and the accession countries
on a per capita income basis and define the reference value for inflation deviation on that
basis. The reference for high income countries would be average inflation rate in the
highest per capita income group, and the reference for the low income countries would be
the average inflation rate in the lowest per capita income group. The logic of grouping the
countries on a per capita income basis is that it is a good proxy of the level of development
and therefore of the extent of the expected faster productivity growth (i.e., of the real
convergence) and hence of the BS effect. Indeed, it is not surprising that the EMU member
countries with the lowest per capita incomes, Portugal and Spain, have recorded higher
than average inflation rates within the euro zone (Chart 3). Such a differentiated treatment
would of course violate the principle of equal treatment between the initial EMU members
and those who join the monetary union later. It is understandable that the principle of
equal treatment was upheld when the initial criteria for joining the EMU were negotiated
and the founding members established the monetary union. It is difficult to imagine how it
could have been otherwise, since finding an agreement on the different rates of inflation to
be assigned to the different countries could have paralyzed the negotiations for ever.
However, now that the monetary union is established and functioning, a more fine tuned
approach that takes into account the laws of economic development would better serve the
efficiency of economic management.
Though logical from a purely economic point of view, there also lies a danger for the
accession countries in the differentiation of the permissible EMU entry-level inflation rate
on the basis of the level of economic development of the candidate countries. This danger
stems from the popular fear in the EMU that such “permissiveness” could dilute the price
stability within the euro zone and hence to weaken the euro. Such fear could weaken the
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political support for enlargement and delay the accession of the CEEs, particularly those
whose per capita income is lowest. A reasonable compromise would be to define the
permissible inflation deviation in reference to the average inflation rate of the euro zone
(the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices, HICP), not the three EU members with the
lowest inflation rate. It is understandable that when Maastricht was negotiated and there
were several national monetary policies, the founding members wanted to encourage
convergence toward the lowest level of inflation. Now that EMU exists and there is a single
monetary policy responsible for the inflation in the zone as a whole, it would make more
sense to define the deviation in reference to the average inflation rate in the euro zone. In
July 2000, this would have given an additional margin of 0.7 percent (1.8 percent EMU
average inflation vs. 1.1 percent average inflation in the three EU countries with the lowest
inflation) for a country wishing to join the EMU
7. Although this difference is small, at such
low levels of inflation even a difference of this magnitude is not insignificant. Another
option would be simply to increase the permissible inflation deviation, but this could also
be regarded as a watering down of the Maastricht criterion and therefore could raise the
same popular fear as mentioned above.
VI. Conclusions
As can be seen from the above discussion, the characteristics of the economies of
accession countries, their decision to adopt a track leading to membership in the euro zone,
and the globalization of financial markets have confronted the authorities of these
countries with a complex set of issues to be taken into account when choosing their
exchange rate system. While EU/EMU accession is still several years away, it is close
enough to require decisions as to what type of exchange rate regime will best serve these
countries’ economic development and the transition to EMU membership. As a result of
the combined impact of globalization and EU convergence, accession countries are likely
to experience continued financial capital inflows which are creating difficult problems of
economic management, even if most of this capital stays in the country. At the same time,
these countries remain exposed to shifts in market sentiment which can cause a sudden
reversal of capital flows not otherwise justified by the development in the fundamentals of
the country. There are no clear-cut solutions for the management of this situation which
poses one of the greatest challenges for the monetary authorities of these countries for the
years ahead, all the way up until EMU membership. This is one reason why those CEE
countries which are the most prepared and the most integrated into the euro zone should
have a strong interest in an early accession to the EU and the EMU. Meanwhile, the choice
of the exchange rate regime in the run-up to EMU should be essentially determined by the
state of the reform process and the political commitment to continued reforms and sound
macroeconomic policies, backed by sufficient wage flexibility to deal with possible reform-
induced or external shocks. If that commitment is strong and wages are flexible, a more
rigid exchange rate regime can be sustainable. Otherwise a flexible arrangement would be
more appropriate.
                                                
7 Within the EU, the lowest inflation rates were recorded by the United Kingdom and Sweden,
which are not members of the EMU. Within the EMU, the average inflation was 1.4 percent in
the three lowest inflation countries. In line with the methodology used by the ECB to assess
compliance with the Maastricht criterion, the figures refer to the increase in the 12-month
average of the HICP during the year ending in July 2000 over the year ending in July 1999.GYÖRGY SZAPÁRY
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